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Abstract. We have been developing a cryptographically sound formal
logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning
about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious
attacker. The approach rests on a probabilistic, polynomial-time seman-
tics for a protocol security logic that was originally developed using
nondeterministic symbolic semantics. This workshop presentation will
discuss ways in which the computational semantics lead to diﬀerent rea-
soning methods and report our progress to date in several directions. One
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the symbolic and computational settings
results from the computational diﬀerence between eﬃciently recognizing
and eﬃciently producing a value. Among the more recent developments
are a compositional method for proving cryptographically sound prop-
erties of key exchange protocols, and some work on secrecy properties
that illustrates the computational interpretation of inductive properties
of protocol roles.
1 Introduction
As is well-known to the Workshop on Formal and Computational Cryptogra-
phy (FCC 2006) audience, there are two important but historically independent
foundations for reasoning about cryptographic protocols, one based on logic
and symbolic computation, and one based on computational complexity theory.
While the symbolic approach has been asuccessful basis for formal logics and au-
tomated tool, the computational approach yields more insight into the strength
and vulnerabilities of protocols. We have developed a cryptographically sound
formal logic for proving protocol security properties without explicitly reasoning
about probability, asymptotic complexity, or the actions of a malicious attacker.
The approach rests on a probabilistic, polynomial-time semantics for a proto-
col security logic that was originally developed using nondeterministic symbolic
semantics. The goal of this work is to show that formal reasoning, based on
an abstract treatment of cryptographic primitives, can be used to reason about
probabilistic polynomial-time protocols in the face of probabilistic polynomial-
time attacks. The semantics we explore in this work reﬂects accepted modelling
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tational semantics brings forward some interesting distinctions that were not
available in the coarser symbolic model, and also raises a number of interesting
technical problems and challenges.
Protocol Composition Logic [11, 7, 8] uses a modal operator similar to Floyd-
Hoare logic. Intuitively, the formula ψ [P ]X φ means that if ψ is true at some
point in the execution of a protocol (in the presence of a malicious attacker),
then φ will be true after agent X performs the sequence P of actions. The
pre- and post-conditions may describe actions taken by various principals and
characterize the information that is available to or hidden from them.
Semantics and Soundness Theorem Our central organizing idea is to interpret
formulas as operators on probability distributions on traces. Informally, repre-
senting a probability distribution by a set of equi-probable traces (each tagged
by the random sequence used to produce it), the meaning of a formula φ on a
set T of traces is the subset T ′ ⊆ T in which φ holds. This interpretation yields
a probability: the probability that φ holds is the ratio |T ′|/|T |. Conjunction and
disjunction are simply intersection and union. There are several possible inter-
pretations for implication, and it is not clear at this point which will prove most
fruitful in the long run. In the present paper, we interpret φ =⇒ ψ as the union
of ¬φ and the composition of ψ with φ; the latter is also the conditional proba-
bility of ψ given φ. This interpretation supports a soundness proof for a sizable
fragment of the protocol logic, and resembles the probabilistic interpretation of
implication in [22]. Since the logic does not mention probability explicitly, we
consider a formula “true” if it holds with asymptotically overwhelming proba-
bility.
In previous work [11, 7, 8] over a symbolic semantic model, the atomic formula
Has(X,m) means that m is in the set of values “derivable,” by a simple ﬁxed
algorithm, from information visible to X. The simple ﬁxed algorithm is central
to what is called the Dolev-Yao model, after [10] and much subsequent work
by others. In replacing the symbolic semantics with a computational semantics
based on probabilistic polynomial time, we replace the predicate Has with two
predicates, Possess and Indist. Intuitively, Possess(X,m) means that there is an
algorithm that computes the value of m from information available to X with
high probability, while Indist(X,m) means that X cannot feasibly distinguish m
from a random value chosen according to the same distribution.
The proof system used in this work is based on one developed in [7, 8, 2].
The axioms embody diﬀerent forms of reasoning employed by cryptographers
including complexity-theoretic reductions, information-theoretic arguments and
asymptotic calculations. The soundness proofs of the axioms are carried out
using similar mathematical techniques. We emphasize that this is a one-time
mathematical eﬀort. Protocol proofs can now be carried out symbolically using
the proof system without explicitly reasoning about probability and complexity.
Another advantage of this approach is that the axioms and rules used in a proof
identify the speciﬁc properties of the cryptographic primitives that are relevant
in order to guarantee the property of the protocol. This information can be
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have more eﬃcient constructions.
Application to key exchange We have developed a compositional method for
proving cryptographically sound security properties of key exchange protocols,
based on this logic. Since reasoning about an unbounded number of runs of a pro-
tocol involves induction-like arguments about properties preserved by each run,
we formulate a speciﬁcation of secure key exchange that is closed under general
composition with steps that use the key. We present formal proof rules based on
this game-based condition, and prove that the proof rules are sound over the com-
putational semantics. We demonstrate the applicability of the proof method by
formalizing and proving some security properties of the ISO-9798-3 key exchange
protocol [20] and its composition with a canonical secure sessions protocol. The
security proof for ISO-9798-3 relies on the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman assumption
and the use of CMA-secure signatures, while the security of the secure sessions
protocol relies on the use of a CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme [15].
The fact that these two protocols compose securely when executed one after the
other follows from the sequential composition theorem [8]. In order to model and
prove security for these protocols, we had to extend the computational model
and logic [9] to include a number of additional cryptographic primitives: sig-
natures, symmetric encryption, as well as codify the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman
assumption. A central concept in many compositional proof methods [1, 12, 13,
6, 8] is an invariant. In developing compositional security proofs of complex pro-
tocols [17], we require that each protocol component respects the invariants of
the other components in the system [8]. It appears that standard cryptographic
security deﬁnitions for key exchange like key indistinguishability [5, 3] are not
invariant in the manner needed for an inductive proof of composition. Even if a
key exchange protocol, run by itself in isolation, produces a key that is indistin-
guishable from a random value chosen from the same distribution, key indistin-
guishability is generally lost as soon as the key is used to encrypt a message of a
known form or with partially known possible content. Moreover, some situations
allow one agent to begin transmitting encrypted data before the other agent ﬁn-
ishes the last step of the key exchange, rendering key indistinguishability false at
the point that the key exchange protocol ﬁnishes. (This appears to be the case
for SSL [14]; see [21] for a discussion of data transfer before the key exchange
finished messages are received.) Furthermore, some key exchange protocols even
use the generated key during the protocol, preventing key indistinguishability.
Fortunately, many protocols that use keys do not require key indistinguishability
to provide meaningful security guarantees. In particular, semantic security [16]
does not require that the keys used remain indistinguishable from random.
To circumvent the technical problems we encountered in working with key
indistinguishability, we propose an alternative notion that is parameterized by
the security goal of the application in which the resulting key is used. As concrete
examples, we consider cases where the key is used for encryption or MAC. The
security deﬁnition for key exchange requires that the key produced is “good” for
that application, i.e. an adversary interacting with the encryption scheme using
10
this key cannot win the security game for that scheme (for example, the IND-
CPA game for encryption). The resulting deﬁnition for key exchange is invariant
under composition with the application protocol which uses the key.
We deﬁne usability of keys obtained through a key exchange protocol Σ with
respect to a class of applications S via a two-phase experiment. The experi-
ment involves a two-phase adversary A = (Ae,Ac). In the key exchange phase,
the honest parties run sessions of the protocol following the standard execution
model: each principal executes multiple sessions of the protocol (as both initiator
and responder) with other principals; the communication between parties is con-
trolled by the adversary Ae. At the end of the key exchange phase, the adversary
selects a challenge session sid among all sessions executed by the honest parties,
and outputs some state information St representing the information Ae was able
to gather during its execution. Let k be the key locally output by the honest
party executing the session sid. At this point, the experiment enters its second
phase—the challenge phase where the goal of the adversary is to demonstrate an
attack against a scheme Π ∈ S which uses the key k. After Ae receives as input
St, it starts interacting with Π according to the game used for deﬁning security
of the application protocols in S. For example, if S is a set of encryption schemes,
then the relevant game may be IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, or IND-CCA2 [15]. Since
the speciﬁc task we treat in this paragraph is secure sessions, we formalize the
case when the game deﬁnes IND-CPA security. Thus, in playing the game, Ac
has access to a left-right encryption oracle under k, and in addition, it receives as
input the state information from Ae. The advantage of the adversary is deﬁned
as for the standard IND-CPA game with the diﬀerence that the probability is
taken over the random coins of the honest parties (used in the execution of the
protocol), the coins of the two adversaries, and the coins used for encryption in
the challenge phase. The keys obtained by running the key exchange protocol
are usable for the schemes in S if this advantage is bounded above by a negligible
function of the security parameter, for all encryption schemes in S. The universal
quantiﬁcation over schemes is used to capture the fact that the security property
is guaranteed for all encryption schemes which satisfy the IND-CPA condition.
We note that in this deﬁnition the adversary Ac is not allowed to interact with
the key exchange protocol in the challenge phase.
Secrecy A secrecy property asserts that no ‘useful’ information about some data
that is used in the protocol is revealed to others. There are protocols, such as
exchanges of signed messages, that provide authentication but not secrecy of
sent data, and similarly there are ways to generate a secret between two parties
(such as Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange) without receiving any guarantee about
the identity of the other party. In many protocols, however, the two properties
turn out to be interdependent, with authentication relying on secrecy of signing
keys or other material, for example. If a protocol generates a fresh value, called a
nonce, and sends it in an encrypted message, then under ordinary circumstances
only agents that have the decryption key can obtain the nonce. However, many
protocols have steps that receive a message encrypted with one key, and send
some of its parts out encrypted with a diﬀerent key. Since network protocols
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are executed asynchronously by independent agents, some potentially malicious,
we need to show that even after arbitrarily many steps of independent protocol
sessions, a secret remains so.
In as-yet-unpublished work, we formalize reasoning about secrecy by intro-
ducing axioms and rules for showing that individual receive-send protocol steps
respect secrecy of message parts, and an induction rule for reasoning about ar-
bitrarily many simultaneous protocol sessions. These proof principles are shown
sound for the probabilistic polynomial-time semantics of protocol execution and
attack. At a high level, the basic ideas are similar to the “rank function method”
[23] and work in the strand space approach [25], both formulated for symbolic
execution models.
The proof system is suﬃcient to prove authentication and secrecy properties
of the Kerberos V5 [19] protocol. Our concise, modular proof provides assur-
ance about the correctness of Kerberos, assuming that the symmetric encryption
scheme is IND-CCA secure and provides ciphertext integrity [4]. Our notion of
‘usefulness’ of the secrets (the session keys) in the protocol is whether they are
good for use as a key in the second stage of the two-phase experiment described
previously.
Although our formal proof system is suﬃcient to prove interesting security
properties of a nontrivial, practical protocol, some intriguing technical questions
remain. As an intermediate step before producing our most recent computation-
ally sound system, we also developed an unpublished proof system for secrecy
over the symbolic model. The symbolically sound proof system appears to be
more powerful, but we do not know whether this is inherent in the change from
symbolic to computational semantics, or a gap that we will be able to close
through further work on the present system.
One speciﬁc issue is illustrated by the variant of the Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol that is used in [18] to illustrate a limitation of the original rank function
method and motivate an extension for reasoning about temporary secrets. We
are able to give a straightforward formal proof of this example in our symboli-
cally sound proof system, but we do not yet have computationally sound rules for
carrying out that argument. A basic limitation in computationally sound reason-
ing is that it is not possible to do case analysis on the structure of messages sent
by an attacker. In the symbolic model, however, every message is represented by
a symbolic expression, and every expression has a syntactic form.
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